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Abstract
The question raised by Shimony and Stein is examined and used
to explain in more detail a key point of my proof that any theory that
conforms to certain general ideas of orthodox relativistic quantum field
theory must permit transfers of information over spacelike intervals.
It is also explained why this result is not a problem for relativistic
quantum theory, but, on the contrary, opens the door to a satisfactory
realistic relativistic quantum theory based on the ideas of Tomonaga,
Schwinger, and von Neumann.
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Shimony and Stein[1] have raised a question about an essential claim
made in my 1997 paper[2]. I begin by explaining the claim, and the question
they raised.
Lines 1 through 5 of my proof[2] show that under certain explicitly stated
conditions the statement
L2⇒ [(R2 ∧ R2+)→ (R1✷→ R1−)] (1)
is true, while lines 6 through 14 of that proof show that under these same
conditions the statement
L1⇒ [(R2 ∧ R2+)→ (R1✷→ R1−)] (2)
is false. Shimony and Stein arrive at the same conclusion—namely that (1)
is true and (2) is false—under similar conditions. I then claim that this fact,
that (1) is true and (2) is false, entails that information must sometimes be
transferred over space-like intervals. Shimony and Stein question this claim,
and suggest that one must make a hidden-variable assumption, as was done
in Bell’s theorems [3,4], in order to arrive at this strong conclusion.
This issue is important, because all the assumptions used my proof are el-
ements of orthodox quantum philosophy, and hence my claim, if valid, means
that the precepts of orthodox quantum philosophy entail that information
must sometimes be transferred over spacelike intervals. That conclusion is
far stronger than what is proved by Bell’s theorem[3], and its usual general-
izations[4,5], and it seems to have profound implications for development of
relativistic quantum theory.
To provide an adequate foundation for the discussion I need to explain
the meanings of (1) and (2), the assumptions that go into my proof that (1)
is true and (2) is false, and the technical differences between my assumptions
and those of Shimony and Stein.
The conditions under which I prove that (1) is true and (2) is false are
these:
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A. The choices made by the experimenters in each of the two regions
R and L about which experiment will be performed in that region can be
treated as free choices, or free variables.
B. There is at least one Lorentz frame of reference, call it LF, such that
if in that frame every point of the spacetime region L is earlier than every
point in the spacetime region R then for any experiment freely chosen and
performed in the earlier region L the outcome that appears to observers in
that region can be taken to be independent of which experiment will be freely
chosen and performed later in the region R: the universe can be regarded as
evolving forward in time in LF and, in particular, there is no action of a free
choice made later in R upon an outcome that has already appeared earlier in
L. This assumption is called LOC1.
C. No matter which experiments are freely chosen and performed, the
predictions of quantum theory will be satisfied.
These assumptions are, I believe, compatible with the precepts of ortho-
dox quantum thinking, and are, in a broad sense, entailed by them.
Notice that the truth of certain very special contrary-to-fact assertions is
entailed by these assumptions. In particular, if the set of possible worlds is
limited by conditions A, B, and C then,
SF: For any possible world W , the following statement is true:
If the situation in W is such that
1. The Hardy experimental conditions are satisfied,
2. Experiment L2 is freely chosen and performed in L,
3. Experiment R2 is freely chosen and performed in R, and
4. The outcome L2+ appears in L,
then in any possible worldW ′ that is the same as worldW except for possible
consequences choosing and performing in region R the experiment R1, in-
stead of the experiment chosen and performed in R in world W , the outcome
in the earlier region L is L2+.
The result asserted by SF is immediately entailed by the stated assump-
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tions, actually just A and B, and it is expressed symbolically as
(L2 ∧ R2 ∧ L2+)⇒ (R1✷→ L2+). (3)
This statement asserts, in brief, that if the theoretical conditions A, B,
and C are satified then freely choosing and performing R1, instead of R2, in
the later region R, leaves the earlier outcome in L undisturbed.
Similarly, the symbolic statement (1) asserts that, under the three con-
ditions A, B, and C, if experiment L2 is freely chosen and performed in the
earlier region L then a certain statement SR is true, whereas statement (2)
makes the same claim under condition L1. Thus the conjunction of the facts
that (1) is true and (2) is false implies that the truth of statement SR de-
pends nontrivially on which of the two alternative possible experiments, L1
or L2, is freely chosen and performed in the space-time region L.
The statement SR just mentioned is represented symbolically by
[(R2 ∧ R2+)→ (R1✷→ R1−)] (4)
It is an assertion about a possible world W , and it states
SR: If in the possible world W the experimenter in the space-time region
R freely chooses and performs experiment R2 and gets the outcome R2+,
then in any possible world W ′ that is the same as world W except for the
possible consequences of choosing in the region R the experiment R1, instead
of whatever was chosen in W (namely R2), the outcome in R is R1−.
In reference [2] I justified each step in the proof that statement (1) is true
and statement (2) is false by using the machinery of David Lewis’s rules of
reasoning with counterfactual statements. The Lewis machinery is reasonable
and orthodox, but was created in the climate where the ideas of deterministic
classical physics prevailed, and in the end it is merely a set of conventions
designed to cope in a deterministic setting with the idea that something
other than what actually happens ’could have happened’. The conventions
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are designed to mesh with our intuitions about the proper use of contrary-to-
fact statements, but there are other contending rules, and the whole situation
is somewhat controversial. But as I have emphasized, and Shimony and Stein
have agreed, the quantum situation permits a more direct approach, which
avoids leaning on the basically conventional features of the classical approach.
Instead, one can exploit the fact the concept of a ‘free choice’ is compatible
with quantum theory, due to its basically indeterministic character. This
allows one to stay with ordinary logic plus a natural specified meaning for
the needed counterfactual assertion.
In order to have a common ground for dealing with the concerns of Shi-
mony and Stein I shall, in this paper, adopt this alternative approach, which
is strictly line with quantum thinking, rather than relying on Lewis’s classical
rules. However, apart from this technical change, I shall adhere to the logical
form of the argument that I used in reference [2]. In particular, I shall retain
the following natural meaning of the statement (E✷→ O):
(E✷→ O) is, by definition, true in a possible world W if and only if out-
come O occurs in any possible world W ′ that is the same as world W except
for the possible consequences of freely choosing and performing experiment
E instead of the alternative experiment freely chosen and performed in W .
The set of possible worlds is limited by the specified conditions A, B, and C.
To use this definition one must limit “the possible consequences of ...”
This is always done by using LOC1. Since this definition is toothless without
this condition LOC1, or some such condition, and since LOC1 is used only
in connection with this definiion, it is not unreasonable to incorporate LOC1
into the definition of the counterfactual statement. Shimony and Stein have
done essentially that. However, they did not do exactly that. My condition
LOC1 excludes from the effects of changing a free choice only effects on
outcomes that have already appeared earlier, in the special Lorentz frame
LF. But Shimony and Stein exclude all effects that lie outside the forward
light-cone of the region in which the change in the free choice occurs.
4
I use the weaker assumption LOC1 because the truth of LOC1 is certainly
compatible with the principles of relativistic quantum field theory, and is in
fact entailed by them, whereas the stronger form used by Shimony and Stein
is incompatible those principles. It is much clearer to argue directly from
assumptions that are true, in the sense of being consequences of orthodox
quantum theory, rather that making an assumption that is incompatible with
relativistic quantum theory.
The fact that LOC1 is entailed in orthodox relativistic quantum field the-
ory is proved by noting that the possibility of defining one such frame LF
follows from the Tomonaga-Schwinger [6,7] formulation of relativistic quan-
tum field theory, in which advancing space-like surfaces are the analogs of
the advancing constant-time surfaces of the non-relativistic formulation of
von Neumann [8]. Of course, an infinitude of alternative possible choices for
LF can be found: any frame will do. But the required property follows for
only one frame or another, not for any two or more together.
With the stage thus set, I can turn to the central question of whether
the conjunction of the truth of (1) and the falsity of (2) can be reconciled,
as Shimony and Stein appear to suggest, with the idea that no information
about the choice made in region L can get to region R, which is situated
spacelike relative to L.
To see the apparent conflict one can consider the consequence of the
fact that (1) is true and (2) is false in the context of the orthodox idea that
“nature chooses the outcome” of the experiment chosen by the experimenter.
In this context the consequence of the truth of (1) and falsity of (2) is that
SR asserts the existence of a definite theoretical connection between the
outcomes that nature delivers under the two alternative possible conditions,
and that this theoretically necessary condition on what nature can do in R
depends nontrivially on which experiment is freely chosen and performed by
the experimenter in L.
But how can any theoretical model—hidden-variable or not— fulfill con-
ditions on Nature’s choices in region R that depend nontrivially on which
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free choice is made in L if no information about this choice made in L can
be present in R?
This apparent result, that any theoretical model that conforms to the con-
ditions A, B, and C must accomodate transfers of information over a spacelike
intervals, does not conflict with the requirements of the theory of relativity, in
the context of quantum theory: it conflicts only with a certain prejudice gen-
erated by uncritically extending to indeterministic quantum theory a feature
of its deterministic classical approximation. This prejudice has, in fact, been
the barrier that has blocked for many years the creation of a satisfactory re-
alistic formulation of relativistic quantum theory. In a quantum context the
Lorentz requirements of relativity theory pertain exclusively to relationships
among observables, not to the reality that lies behind the phenomena. Thus
the obvious realistic, relativistic quantum theory is just relativistic quantum
field theory with a preferred sequence of advancing Tomonaga-Schwinger [6,7]
spacelike surfaces defining the successive instants “now”.
This entails, of course, a reversion to the pre-relativity Newtonian idea
of an absolute time, or something similar to it, at the underlying ontolog-
ical level. But the founders of quantum theory strongly stressed the fact
that this theory, as they conceived it, was only about relationships between
observations, not about properties of the underlying reality. The Tomonage-
Schwinger theory maintains all the observable requirements of the theory
of relativity, no matter how the preferred sequence of advancing spacelike
surfaces is chosen. Hence the only thing actually blocking acceptance of
this theory as the relativistic quantum theory of reality is the prejudicial
assumption that the reality itself, like the connections between observations,
can have no transfer of information over spacelike intervals. But the fact that
this condition can be maintained in the deterministic classical limit, where
the entire history of the universe is determined by the initial conditions, and
can immediately be laid out on a space-time background, with no free choices
allowed, does not entail that it can be maintained in the full indeterministic
theory with free choices allowed.
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The analysis of the Hardy case supports the view that the reality behind
the indeterministic quantum rules cannot maintain this constraint. That
observation immediately elevates John von Neumann’s [8] formulation of
quantum theory, applied to Tomonaga-Schwinger relativistic quantum field
theory, to prime candidacy as the paradigm relativistic quantum theory of
reality.
Shimony and Stein allege that this apparent result—that the information
about whether L1 or L2 was freely chosen and performed in region L must
be available in region R of—is incorrect. They base their argument on the
assertion that the semantical truth conditions for the counterfactual in ques-
tion refer explicitly to the entire exterior of the extended future light-cone of
R.
That claim about the entire exterior is not exactly true in my version of
the proof. The statement SR combine with LOC1 says:
SR-LOC1: “If in the possible world W the experiment R2 is freely chosen
and performed in R and the outcome there is R2+ then if W ′ is a possible
world that is the same as W in L, but in which R1 is freely chosen and
performed in R, instead of R2, the outcome in R in world W ′ is R1−.
In spite of the difference between the light-cone version of the causality
condition used by Shimony and Stein and the condition LOC1 used by me,
this combined statement SR-LOC1 exhibits the feature pointed to by Shi-
mony and Stein: a reference to the region L, which lies outside the forward
light cone of the region R. It is this implicit reference of SR to L that Shi-
mony and Stein are concerned about. The question is whether this reference
to L upsets my essential claim that the conjunction of the truth of (1) and the
falsity of (2) requires the information about whether L1 or L2 is performed
in L to be present in R.
Let me begin my answer by explaining the question in more detail.
The statement SR involves the words “instead of”. We have a clear idea
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of what we mean here by ”instead of”. In the real situation the experimenter
in R makes the choice R2. But we have assumed that, just at the moment of
choosing, the other choice R1 could have popped out instead of R2. But the
central idea is that everything prior to that moment of choosing is exactly
what it is in the actual world: there is just one evolving quantum world,
which could go either way at the moment of choice.
This condition of sameness prior to the moment of choice is the condition
that limits the changes permitted by the phrase “except for the possible
consequences of the change in the free choice”: no possible consequence of a
changed choice can lie earlier than the moment of choice.
The point raised by Shimony and Stein, as applied to my argument, is
that this implicit reference to the (unchanged) state of affairs (in L) prior to
the moment of the choice between R1 and R2 is an essential element of the
very idea of “instead of” that appears in the statement SR. Hence there is in
SR an essential implicit reference to region L, even though all the symbols
explicitly appearing in SR pertain to possible events in R.
Their concern about this implicit reference to L stems from the fact that
in my 1997 paper I based my argument—for the claim that the conjunction
of the truth of (1) and falsity of (2) entails a violation of the idea that
“observable effects can propagate only into the future (light-cone)”—on the
fact that “everything mentioned in SR is an observable phenomenon in region
R.” Their concern is that the essential implicit reference of SR to the region
L might upset my argument.
This essential implicit reference of SR to L does not affect my argument.
To understand why it does not, one must note that the steps in a logical
argument are like a series of black boxes, each of which displays explicitly
only certain of the variables of the system. These explicitly displayed vari-
ables are like inputs and outputs: certain connection between these variables
are exhibited, but the reasons why these connections hold are not shown.
However, all of the relevant effects pertaining to the inner workings must be
controlled by the displayed variables.
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In the statement (1),
L2⇒ [(R2 ∧R2+)→ (R1✷→ R1−)],
the only displayed variables are L2, R2, R2+, R1, and R1−. The input con-
ditions are L2, R2, R2+, and R1, and the output is R1−. The statement
asserts that if the input variables L2, R2, R2+, and R1 are put into a certain
logical expression, the output must be R1−, never R1+, But the falseness
of (2) says that if the inputs are changed only by changing L2 to L1, then
the output is no longer restricted to R1−: it is now allowed to be R1+. So
changing the input variable from L2 to L1 has affected the output variable
R1 + /R1−. There can be all sorts of dependence on all sorts of inner vari-
ables, but whatever these dependences are they must, to the extent that they
are relevant to the output conclusion, be controlled by the input variables, if
the statement is indeed logically correct. So, in this case at hand, changing
the input variable L1/L2 affects nontrivially the output variable R1+/R1−.
But then the information about whether L1 or L2 is chosen in L must get
to the regionR where the value of the output variable R1+/R1− is displayed.
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